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Abstract
This note is concerned with the e¤ects of joint ownership of
complements when they are vertically di¤erentiated. We provide
strong arguments for the positive nature of network integration
among rms, while showing at the same time that, in some cir-
cumstances, anti-competitive consequences can be observed un-
der acquisition.
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1 Introduction
This note is concerned with the e¤ects of M&As between producers of
asymmetric complementary goods in vertically di¤erentiated markets.
Since the pioneristic work by Cournot (1938), the view that an inter-
grated monopoly may be benecial to consumers is generally shared.
The joint ownership of complements benets consumers as it removes
a problem of double marginalization while possibly passing through to
consumers further gains.1 This clear-cut mergers implication is miti-
gated in oligopoly markets. Indeed, while the joint ownership determines
verticalintegration between producers of di¤erent components, it also
decreases competition in the market while inducing horizontalintegra-
tion between producers of a given component. While the former e¤ect
pushes prices downwards, the latter pushes prices upward (Economides
and Salop 1992).2
In this note, we re-examine the above evoked competing e¤ects in a
framework of vertical di¤erentiation. We put the argument in the sim-
pest possible setting. There is an incumbent monopolist that produces
a base good. This good can be equipped with a complementary compo-
nent, which is produced by the monopolist itself and a potential entrant.
The value of the base good increases with the quality of the complemen-
tary component with which it is bundled. The monopolist produces a
complementary component whose quality is assumed to be lower than
that produced by the potential entrant. When facing the rival, the mo-
nopolist can either deter entry by selling pure bundles, so that only
the low quality system is marketed; or accept entry by o¤ering mixed
bundles, so that both qualities are available; or acquire the entrant, in
which case only the high quality system is put on sale. We prove that,
if allowed, acquisition would be always observed at equilibrium. Oth-
erwise mixed bunbling would arise. Further, we show that acquisition
could be welfare improving under some conditions on market size and
quality di¤erential among complements. This holds as in vertically dif-
ferentiated markets, under joint ownership, on one hand the traditional
1For example, when the quality of a two-products system is determined by the
minimum of the qualities of its components, an integrated monopoly in which both
complementary goods are sold by a single integrated rm dominates complementary
monopolies (namely, independent ownership) in terms of welfare implications: in
fact, the rst entails higher quality goodsand higher market coverage (Economides
1999, Maruyama et al. 2011) while neutralizing the vertical externality of double
marginalization.
2Recent contributions show that welfare losses may be also due to the prac-
tice of mixed bundling by merged rms or foreclosure (Choi 2008, Flores-Fillol and
Moner-Colonques 2011). Interestingly, both these pratices develop along a reducing-
competition dimension.
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welfare enhancing e¤ect (taking place when the double marginalization
is removed) can be magnied by an increase in the average quality of
consumption; on the other hand, the negative horizontal externality can
play a minor role when the market is su¢ ciently large. 3 These argu-
ments can be valuable for competition agencies when evaluating mergers
in vertically di¤erentiated markets.
2 The basic framework
We consider a market with a monopolist I and a potential entrant E.
The monopolist sells a base good of quality u to a population of con-
sumers identied by the parameter  2 [a; b], 0  a < b and uniformly
distributed with density equal to 1. Both the monopolist I and the po-
tential entrant E can sell a complementary asset of quality vI and vE,
respectively, with vE > vI . The complementary good does not bring
any value to the consumers who do not buy the base good. Still, it
allows the base good to perform better. Let ui be the overall quality of
the base good when sold equipped with the complementary variant vi,
i = I; E, uE > uI > u holds.4 The average cost of production of both
the base good and the complementary assets are assumed to be constant
and, without loss of generality, equal to zero. When facing the rival, the
monopolist can deter entry by selling pure bundles (PB); accept entry
by o¤ering mixed bundles (MB), namely both the base good without
further complementary variant and the low quality bundle; acquire the
entrant and thus sell on its behalf the complementary high quality vari-
ant vE. In this latter case, the incumbent has to pay an acquisition price
to the entrant while avoiding open competition.
We analyse these scenarios in turn, from both a private and a social
welfare point of view.
3 Equilibrium analysis
Bundling strategy Let us rst consider the bundling strategy. Un-
der pure bundling, the incumbent extends the monopoly power to the
complementary market and sells only a good of quality uI > u. Each con-
sumer  can either buy the low quality bundle and get utility uI PI or
not buying at all and get a nil utility. The incumbent equilibrium prot
3Quite interestingly, although this result heavily rests on the assumption that
the complementary components are vertically di¤erentiated, it is in line with the
rationale stated by Economides and Salop (1992).
4As it will be clear after the equilibrium analysis, the opposite case in which the
incumbent can o¤er a high quality bundle is trivial: at equilibrium pure bundling
always arises.
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is PBI =
1
4
uIb
2; the equilibrium consumer surplus is CSPB = 1
8
uIb
2.5
Under mixed bundling, each consumer can either buy only the base
good at price pu and get utility u  pu; or buy the base good equipped
with the low quality (resp. high quality) complementary variant at some
price PI (resp. pu+rE; where rE is the price of vE sold by the entrant) in
which case the utility is uI   PI (resp. uE   pu   rE); or refrain from
buying. At equilibrium the incumbent nds it protable to quote for
the base good a price pu so high that no consumer buys the base good
alone. Then, the rst consumer willing to buy something is  = PI
uI
.6
Accordingly, the incumbent and the entrant prots functions write as,
respectively:
MBI (PI ; pu; rE)= (
   )PI + (b  )pu;
MBE (PI ; pu; rE)= (b  )rE:
where  = pu+rE PI
uE uI is the consumer indi¤erent between buying the low
quality bundle and the base good equipped with the high quality com-
plementary variant. Price competition leads to the following equilibrium
prices, prots and consumer surplus:
pu=
1
6
uI +
1
3
uE; PI =
1
2
buI ; rE =
1
3
b (uE   uI) ;
MBI =
1
36
b2 (5uI + 4uE) ;
MB
E =
1
9
(uE   uI) b2;
CSMB =
4u2E(2b 1)2+uIuE(b 2)2+u2I(2b 8b2+1)
72(uE uI) :
Comparing these two scenarios, we nd that the incentive to mixed
bundling always dominates that to pure bundling, namely MBI  PBI >
0. Note that under these two scenarios the equilibrium demands for the
incumbent coincide.7 However, under MB the incumbent benets from
the presence of the high quality variant. Indeed, he can put in place a
sort of price discrimination, thereby raising the price of the base good
pu to such an extent that this latter is sold only to consumers buying
it equipped with a variant, whatever it is. As for consumer surplus we
nd CSMB   CSPB > 0. Mixed bundling is thus superior from the so-
cial welfare point of view, as it is preferred by the rms as well as by
consumers.
5Given the demand b  PIuI , it is straightforward to nd these equilibrium variables.
Note also that for this and the subsequent equilibria we nd, we do not assume a
priori that the market is, or is not, covered.
6The proof of this result is available from the authors upon request. See Gab-
szewicz, Sonnac and Wauthy (2001) for an interesting analysis related to this point.
7At equilibrium the demand for the incumbent is
 
b   = 12b under PB and
(   ) + (b  ) = 16b+ 13b = 12b under MB.
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Acquisition strategy Let us now move to consider the case when
the incumbent acquires at some acquisition price PA the entrant thereby
avoiding open competition. A priori, in this scenario the monopolist
can sell all three variants, combinations of two of them, or only one of
them, namely the top combination uE at price PE.8 Suppose that the
incumbent sells all the three variants. Then, the prot maximization
problem writes as
max
pu;PI ;PE

(e   )pu + (   e)PI + (b  )PE
where PE is the price of the high quality bundle; the indi¤erent consumer
types are  = pu
u
, e = PI pu
uI u and
 = PE PI
uE uI . Equilibrium prices, prot
and consumer surplus are then:
PAcqE =
1
2
buE; P
Acq
I =
1
2
buI ; p
Acq
u =
1
2
bu;
AcqI =
1
4
uEb
2;
CSAcq =
1
8
uEb
2:
At equilibrium the incumbent sells only the high quality variant.9 A
positive market expansion e¤ect of selling more than one quality is over-
compensated by a negative cannibalization e¤ect.10
Equilibrium strategy It remains now to set the equilibrium analysis,
namely to see whether the incentive to acquisition dominates that to
mixed bundling. To this aim, notice that, in order to be preferred over
the alternative, the acquisition proposal should yield the entrantE a gain
at least equal to the prots it would get under turning o¤ the proposal,
namely MBE . Of course, it follows that the acquisition price PA has to
be equal to MBE . Furthermore, it is convenient for the incumbent I to
make such a proposal if, and only if, prots obtained when acquiring the
entrant after paying the acquisition price are larger than the prots it
would get in the alternative scenario, namely MBI . As 
Acq
I  PA > MBI
with PA = MBE , we can state the following.
Proposition 1 At equilibrium, acquisition always prevails over bundling.
8Selling only the low combination uI is the pure bundling scenario.
9In fact PAcqI and p
Acq
u are such that the demands for the base good alone and
the low quality bundle are equal to zero
10Since the pioneristic contribution of Mussa and Rosen (1978), a huge amount of
literature has considered the protability of quality discrimination by a monopolist
in a vertically di¤erentiated market. See Acharyya (1998), Gabszewicz and Wauthy
(2002), inter alia.
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4 Acquisition and welfare
We have shown above that the privately optimal strategy is acquisition.
We next wonder whether a competition authority would allow such an
acquisition, taking into account that the outside option is MB. For sake
of simplicity, as a measure of welfare we consider consumer surplus (CS).
Notice however that, moving to the social welfare as alternative measure
of welfare would not a¤ect our qualitative results.
Comparing the equilibrium consumer surplus under MB vs Acq, we
nd:
CSMB   CSAcq = (2buI uI+uE(b 2))(uE(7b 2) 4buI uI)
72(uE uI) :
The sign of
 
CSMB   CSAcq depends on the market size, b and the
quality di¤erential uE
uI
= U ; in particular, it is the same as the sign of:
((2b  1) + U (b  2)) (U (7b  2)  (4b+ 1)) :
Simple calculations reveal that:
 for b > 2 or b < 2=7, CSAcq < CSMB always holds;
 for b 2 (1; 2), CSAcq > CSMB () U > U = (2b 1)
(2 b) ;
 nally, for b 2 (2=7; 1), CSAcq > CSMB () U > ~U = (4b+1)
(7b 2) .
Under MB, both qualities are on sale whereas under Acq, only the
high quality good is marketed. So, moving from MB to Acq entails four
e¤ects on consumers.
A rst negative e¤ect linked to the reduction of the number of qual-
ities, in particular some of the consumers that under MB buy the low
quality good, do not buy anymore under Acq. This negative e¤ect is
stronger, the higher is b, that is the heterogeneity among consumers.11
A second positive e¤ect is due to the fact that some of the consumers
that under MB buy the low quality good are now willing to buy the
high quality good under Acq. This positive composition e¤ect of de-
mand is particularly strong when the quality gap, uE
uI
, is high. Finally,
when switching from MB to Acq, we have two contrasting e¤ects on
prices. On one hand competition becomes milder as we now have only
one rm rather than two; this negative competition e¤ect is not very
strong when the market is large (it is as if each rm had its own seg-
ment of the market), in contrast it becomes strong when the market is
11Indeed, ceteris paribus, the higher b the higher is the heterogeneity among con-
sumers, namely the lower is the amount of consumers willing to buy the high quality
variant rather than to stop buying.
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small, as competition in this case is tough. On the other hand under Acq
the monopolist internalizes the double marginalization problem that is
at work underMB ; this is a positive pricing e¤ect for consumers and it is
stronger the lower is b.12 Comparing equilibrium prices we nd that for
high (resp. low) values of b, namely b > 2 (resp. b < 1) the equilibrium
price of the high quality variant under acquisition is higher (resp. lower)
than the corresponding one under mixed bundling.
The rst negative e¤ect linked to the reduction of the number of
varieties dominates when b is su¢ cienty large, thus driving the preference
for MB over Acq. The third negative competition e¤ect dominates when
b is particularly small, thus driving the preference for MB over Acq.
Finally, for intermediate values of b, the four e¤ects balance in such a
way that the second positive e¤ect dominates as long as the quality gap
is high, thus driving the preference for Acq over MB.
The following Proposition summarizes our previous considerations.13
Proposition 2 As long as the market size is either particularly large or
small, acquisition is welfare detrimental. In contrast, for an intermediate
market size acquistion is welfare improving if and only if the quality gap
is su¢ ciently high.
This result represents something to chew on by competition agencies
when evaluating proposed mergers. Indeed, it shows that in vertically
di¤erentiated markets, the traditional welfare enhancing e¤ect (taking
place when the double marginalization is removed) can be magnied
by a positive composition e¤ect of demand. Further, as the negative
horizontal externality can play a minor role when the market is su¢ -
ciently large, it may well happen that, even when enhancing a monopoly
structure, M&As can benet consumers.
5 Conclusion
This note sheds light on the e¤ects of joint ownership of complements
when they are vertically di¤erentiated. Although our model is highly
stylized, still it provides strong arguments for the positive nature of net-
work integration among rms in vertically di¤erentated markets, while
showing at the same time that, under some circumstances, anti-competitive
consequences can be observed.
12These two e¤ects on prices resemble
the horizontal and vertical externatlities observed by Economides and Salop (1992).
13The full proof Proposition 2 involves tedious comparisons and is available from
the authors upon request (also with comparison of the total social welfare under MB
vs Acq).
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